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Republication as Proof of Actual Malice in a
Previous Defamatory Publication: Weaver v.
Lancaster Newspapers, Inc.
PUBLIC FIGURE DEFAMATION - ACTUAL MALICE - PROOF - The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that republication of a de-
famatory statement made by a defendant may be used to prove
actual malice in the initial publication of the defamatory state-
ment.
Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 926 A.2d 899 (Pa. 2007).
Appellant, police officer Robin Weaver, filed a defamation action
against Lancaster Newspapers, Inc. and the writer of a letter to
the editor, Oscar Lee Brownstein, for publication of a letter claim-
ing Weaver raped a murder suspect.' The trial court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 2 The superior court
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.3 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine whether
defendant Brownstein's act of allowing republication of the letter,
after notice of the defamatory nature of the material, was relevant
to establish defendant's actual malice in the initial publication. 4
In 1991, Weaver was involved in the investigation of the murder
of a sixteen-year-old girl.5 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus of the woman convicted of the murder, Lisa
Michelle Lambert. 6 In the course of the habeas corpus proceeding,
1. Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, 926 A.2d 899, 901 (Pa. 2007).
2. Weaver, 926 A.2d at 901.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 902. The court granted allocatur limited to the issue of republication, which
pertains only to defendant Brownstein. Id. Therefore, Lancaster Newspapers was not
involved in this proceeding. Id. at 902 n.2. Allocatur literally translates to: "[it is allowed.
[It] formerly indicated that a writ, bill, or other pleading was allowed. It is still used today
in Pennsylvania to denote permission to appeal." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 83 (8th ed.
2004).
5. Weaver, 926 A.2d at 901. "Weaver was an East Lampeter Township police officer in
Lancaster County, [Pennsylvania]." Id.
6. Id. Lambert's conviction was affirmed in the superior court. Id. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania denied appeal. Id. A writ of habeas corpus is commonly filed in
order to bring a party in front of a court to determine the legality of a party's imprisonment
or detention. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1642 (8th ed. 2004).
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Lambert alleged that Weaver and two other officers had raped her
during the investigation. 7 In its opinion reversing Lambert's con-
viction, the district court made statements indicating that it be-
lieved Weaver and other officers had made up and tampered with
evidence and had lied before the court.8 No charges were filed
concerning those allegations. 9
Defendant Brownstein submitted a letter to the editor of the In-
telligencer Journal alleging that Weaver had, in fact, raped Lam-
bert and that he had been arraigned for the sexual abuse of
women and children in the time since the Lambert case. 10
In response to publication of this letter, Weaver filed defamation
claims against both Brownstein and the publisher of the newspa-
per." The trial court granted Brownstein's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that Weaver had failed to establish that
Brownstein had acted with actual malice. 12 Three months after
Weaver filed suit, Brownstein consented to the republication of his
letter in its entirety on the "Free Lisa Lambert" website. 13
The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment. 14 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
then granted allocatur. 15 Review was limited to the issue of
whether Brownstein's act of consenting to the letter's republica-
tion, while knowing of its probable falsity, was sufficient as cir-
cumstantial evidence of actual malice to withstand Brownstein's
motion for summary judgment. 16
Chief Justice Cappy wrote the opinion of the court. 17 The chief
justice stated that it would be appropriate for a trial court to grant
summary judgment only if there could be no dispute as to the ma-
terial fact of actual malice in Brownstein's initial publication of
7. Weaver, 926 A.2d at 901.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. In his letter, Brownstein stated that Weaver had knowledge of a broken door at
Lambert's apartment and led two other officers there, where they raped her at gunpoint.
Id. He also stated that Weaver had been "arraigned for the sexual abuse of women and
children." Id.
11. Id.




16. Id. The court specifically wanted to evaluate the applicability of a 1947 decision,
O'Donnell v. Philadelphia Record Co., 51 A.2d 775 (Pa. 1947). Id.
17. Weaver, 926 A.2d at 900. Justices Castille, Eakin, Baer, and Baldwin joined in the
opinion. Id. at 908. Justice Saylor concurred in the result. Id. Justice Newman did not
participate in the decision. Id.
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the letter. 18 Chief Justice Cappy also noted that a trial court must
view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party
when considering a summary judgment decision. 19 The supreme
court's standard of review was de novo on both the issue of
whether a genuine issue of material fact existed and whether re-
publication was relevant to a showing of actual malice in the
original publication.
20
The court discussed Pennsylvania defamation law in addressing
whether republication of the letter indicated actual malice in the
initial publication. 21 Because Weaver was a public figure, it was
necessary for Weaver to set forth a prima facie case of defamation,
as well as to present evidence that the defendant had acted with
actual malice. 22 Chief Justice Cappy concluded that the superior
court erred as a matter of law by deciding that the republication of
allegedly defamatory material could not serve as circumstantial
evidence of actual malice in the initial publication. 23 The court
stated that, because republication may make the initial existence
of actual malice more or less probable, republication is therefore
relevant to whether malice was present in the first instance.
24
The court further reasoned that Brownstein had notice of the de-
famatory nature of his letter when republished, which may point
18. Id. at 902. A party may move for, and the court may grant, summary judgment
"whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the
cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert
report." PA. R. CIV. P. 1035.2(1).
19. Weaver, 926 A.2d at 902.
20. Id. at 902-03.
21. Id. at 903.
22. Id. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to go forward with evidence establishing
a prima facie case for defamation. Id. The elements of a prima facie case of defamation are
as follows:
(1) The defamatory character of the communication; (2) Its publication by the
defendant; (3) Its application to the plaintiff; (4) The understanding by the re-
cipient of its defamatory meaning; (5) The understanding by the recipient of it
as intended to be applied to plaintiff; (6) Special harm resulting to plaintiff
from its publication; and (7) Abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343(a) (2007).
The court also noted that actual malice must be shown if the plaintiff is a public figure.
Weaver, 926 A.2d at 903. A defendant acts with actual malice if he published the defama-
tory statement "with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of
its falsity." Id. (citing Curan v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 439 A.2d 652, 659 (Pa.
1981) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964))).
23. Weaver, 926 A.2d at 905.
24. Id. at 904. "[R]epublication was relevant to the jury's inquiry because if there was
abuse of privilege in the original publication, the jury may have found the republication




to indifference for the truth of the statements at the time the let-
ter was first published.25
The court dismissed the superior court's determination that re-
publication only indicated what Brownstein's state of mind was
after the initial publication. 26 The court then found that, because
republication was relevant to actual malice, a jury had to decide
the correct weight to afford that evidence. 27 The court further
held that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment
based upon statements by the defendant that he had made a mis-
take in good faith. 28 A jury should have had the opportunity to
evaluate the credibility of the defendant's statements because evi-
dence presented to support a motion for summary judgment must
be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.29
The court concluded by addressing Brownstein's argument that
the trial court's role is of greater importance when granting sum-
mary judgment in defamation issues because of the First Amend-
ment rights involved. 30 The court stated that the defendant had
confused the trial court's role of "gatekeeper" in summary judg-
ment proceedings with the role of appellate courts in assessing the
constitutionality of issues of actual malice only after they have
been before a jury. 31
Defamation is a tort encompassing the smaller torts of libel and
slander. 32 It is the making of an untrue statement that is damag-
ing to the reputation of another. 33 Because the harm inherent in
defamation is to the reputation of plaintiff in the opinion of others,
communication of the defamatory statement must be made to a
25. Weaver, 926 A.2d at 906.
26. Id.
27. Id. The court determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact in dispute,
as Brownstein's deposition showed that he first admitted to consenting to republication but
later denied any memory of whether he consented or not. Id. at 907. Therefore, the issue
of actual malice should have gone to the jury. Id.
28. Id. at 907.
29. Id. The lower court erred when it relied on the defendant's statements that he
made a mistake in good faith. Id.
30. Weaver, 926 A.2d at 907.
31. Id.
32. W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS § 111 (5th ed. 1984).
Libel is a "defamatory statement expressed in a fixed medium, esp. writing but also a pic-
ture, sign, or electronic broadcast." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (8th ed. 2004). Slander
is a "defamatory assertion expressed in a transitory form, esp. speech." Id. at 448.
33. KEETON, supra note 32, § 111. Defamation is the "act of harming the reputation of
another by making a false statement to a third person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th
ed. 2004).
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third party in order for the statement to be actionable. 34 The
plaintiff has the burden of proof in defamation actions.
35
At early common law, media publishers were subject to liability
for all defamatory statements regarding public officials, unless
some privilege existed or the truth of the statements could be
proved. 36 In 1964, in New York Times v. Sullivan37 , the United
States Supreme Court limited recovery possibilities for public offi-
cial plaintiffs in defamation cases. 38 In New York Times, a County
Commissioner brought a defamation action against the New York
Times for publishing an advertisement that made false and inac-
curate allegations about the police force in Montgomery, Alabama,
which was under his control. 39 The Court considered whether the
Alabama libel law, which required proof of actual malice only to
award punitive, but not general damages, violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of free speech and press.
40
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan held that the Ala-
bama libel laws were unconstitutional. 41 He required public offi-
cial defamation plaintiffs to show that the defendant acted with
actual malice in the publication of defamatory statements as an
element of a prima facie case for defamation. 42 Brennan empha-
sized the importance of lively public debate in which people are
free to criticize their public officials. 43 He asserted that a law
which, in effect, required a person who publicly criticized a public
official to guarantee the truth of his statement, or else be subject
34. KEETON, supra note 32, § 111.
35. Id. § 113. In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving when
the issue is properly raised:
(1) The defamatory character of the communication; (2) Its publication by the
defendant; (3) Its application to the plaintiff; (4) The understanding by the re-
cipient of its defamatory meaning; (5) The understanding by the recipient of it
as intended to be applied to the plaintiff; (6) Special harm resulting to the
plaintiff from its publication; (7) Abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343(a) (2007).
36. KEETON, supra note 32, § 113.
37. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
38. N.Y imes, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
39. Id. at 256. The ad was entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices" and spoke of violent
responses targeted at Southern Negro students who conducted peaceful demonstrations.
Id. In particular, the ad indicated that Montgomery police had taken excessive and violent
measures to stop the demonstrations. Id. at 257. While the ad did not specifically mention
Sullivan, he argued that because he was County Commissioner, in charge of the police,
those reading the ad would understand him to have authorized the action of the police. Id.
at 258. Some of the claims made in the ad were erroneous. N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 257-58.
40. Id. at 256.
41. Id. at 283-84.
42. Id. at 279-80.
43. N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
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to liability, would promote self censorship in derogation of First
Amendment goals. 44 Brennan reasoned that dynamic public dis-
cussion, including harsh criticism of the conduct of public officials,
should not lose its constitutional protection merely because it
achieved its desired effect in lessening the reputation of those offi-
cials. 45 He stated that, in the course of lively public discussion, it
is inevitable that an untrue statement will be made, but that
those statements must be protected in order to preserve an unin-
hibited exchange. 46 Thus, the Court concluded it was necessary to
forbid public officials from recovering damages in defamation ac-
tions unless it could be shown that the defendant acted with ac-
tual malice.
47
Four years later, the Supreme Court decided the issue of what
constitutes reckless disregard within the context of actual mal-
ice. 48 In St. Amant v. Thompson, St. Amant, who was running for
public office, cited portions of an interview with a member of the
local teamster's union during a televised speech. 49 St. Amant re-
cited the teamster's accusation that Thompson, the Deputy Sher-
iff, had improperly accepted money from a union official. 50 The
Supreme Court held that Thompson failed to establish that St.
Amant had acted with actual malice, because he had not demon-
strated that St. Amant had made the defamatory statements with
sufficient recklessness to prove actual malice. 51 The Court stated
44. Id. at 278.
45. Id. at 273. Brennan looked to the events surrounding the Sedition Act of 1798, ch.
74, §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. 596, 596-97 (expired 1801), for support of his argument that harm to the
reputation of public officials is no reason to limit public criticism of their official conduct.
NY Times, 376 U.S. at 272 (quoting 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
553-54 (1876)). The Act made it a crime to make false or outrageous statements regarding
the government of the United States, Congress, or the President with the intent to defame
or harm the public opinion of them. Id. The Act was held unconstitutional by the General
Assembly of Virgina and was vigorously opposed by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.
Id.
46. N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
47. Id. at 279-80.
48. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
49. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 728.
50. Id. at 729.
51. Id. at 730. The initial trial occurred before the decision in New York Times was
issued, and the trial court issued judgment for Thompson. Id. at 729. By the time St.
Amant moved for a new trial, New York Times had been decided, and the trial court fac-
tored that into consideration of St. Amant's motion, but decided that decision did not affect
its holding, and denied the motion. Id. The Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed, finding
that New York Times was applicable and that Thompson had not shown actual malice. Id.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that New
York Times was applicable but that Thompson had proved actual malice. St. Amant, 390
U.S. at 729.
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that reckless disregard, in the context of actual malice, is not
measured by the reasonable man standard and that the plaintiff
must show instead that the defendant actually doubted the truth
of the publication. 52 The Court recognized that its decision could
encourage deliberate ignorance by publishers, but said that the
public's interest in the conduct of its public officials is so great
that the protection of some erroneous publications was worth the
risk. 53 The Court provided that a mere assertion of good faith
would not save a defendant from liability. 54 The finding of good or
bad faith publication, the Court held, should be decided by the
jury. 5 The Court found that Thompson had not produced evi-
dence to show that St. Amant had acted with reckless disregard
for the truth. 56
Following the Supreme Court decisions on public official defa-
mation cases, Pennsylvania courts adopted the Supreme Court's
requirement and definition of actual malice. In Curran v. Phila-
delphia Newspapers,57 tL. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied
the New York Times and St. Amant standards for actual malice in
public official defamation cases.58 In Curran, a resigning United
States Attorney brought two actions against a newspaper, one for
an article regarding his resignation and another for an article con-
cerning his activities while in office. 59 The newspaper moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that actual malice could not be
proven and the supreme court granted the motion as to the article
regarding Curran's resignation, but ordered the case concerning
Curran's successor's comments to go to the jury.60 Quoting the
language of the Supreme Court in New York Times, the court
52. Id. at 731. Justice White stated:
Reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact enter-
tained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such
doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual
malice.
Id.
53. Id. at 731-32.
54. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 439 A.2d 652.
58. Curran, 439 A.2d 652.
59. Id. at 654. One article stated that he resigned because the Justice Department was
going to ask for his resignation, and the other article incorrectly quoted his successor as
claiming that Curran had not prosecuted white collar crimes when the defendants were
politically connected. Id. at 655.
60. Id. at 653-54.
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spoke of the necessity of showing actual malice. 61 The court
stated that, in order for a public official defamation action to sur-
vive a motion for summary judgment, evidence of actual malice
must be strong enough to create a genuine issue of material fact.
62
Applying New York Times and St.Amant, the court held that ac-
tual malice was not shown where the defendant received informa-
tion regarding the defamatory statement from a reliable source,
stating that the reliability of that source precludes the finding
that the defendant published the statement with reckless disre-
gard for its truth.6 3 The court also applied the St. Amant rule that
a defendant cannot escape defamation charges by stating that it
believed the statements to be true due to some misunderstanding
and that a jury must determine whether the defendant acted in
good faith.
64
In order for a publication to have been made with actual malice,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant doubted the truth of
the statement at the time of publication. 65 Weaver concerns how
the defendant's state of mind regarding the truth of the publica-
tion may be proved. 66 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court consid-
ered whether republication of a defamatory statement may be
used to indicate indifference for the truth of the statement at the
time of the initial publication in O'Donnell v. Philadelphia Record
Co.6 7 In O'Donnell, the defendant published an article calling the
plaintiff, a newspaper writer, a Naziphile. 68 The defendant repub-
lished the article after the plaintiff had filed suit, and the court
held that evidence of improper motive in republication was rele-
vant to the consideration of improper motive in the initial publica-
tion.6 9 Like the court in O'Donnell, the Restatement (Second) of
61. Id. at 659.
62. Id. at 659.
63. Curan, 439 A.2d at 660. The newspaper had received word of the Justice Depart-
ment's apparent dissatisfaction with Curran's performance and the likelihood that it would
ask for his resignation from the Special Assistant to the Attorney General. Id. at 659. The
court ruled that the action for the article regarding Curran's resignation presented no issue
of material fact and granted summary judgment for the newspaper. Id. at 663.
64. Id. at 663. The newspaper argued that the article claiming that Curran did not
prosecute white collar defendants who had political connections was the result of a misun-
derstanding. Id. at 662. The court refused to grant the newspaper's motion for summary
judgment in this action and ordered that it go to trial. Id. at 663.
65. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
66. Weaver, 926 A.2d at 900.
67. 51 A.2d 775 (Pa. 1947).
68. O'Donnell, 51 A.2d at 775.
69. Id. at 779. "This republication was relevant in the jury's inquiry; if there was abuse
of privilege in the original publication, the jury may have found the republication convinc-
ing evidence of wrong motive, of actual malice." Id. at 779.
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Torts takes the position that republication of a defamatory state-
ment, after the defendant has been notified that the statement is
likely to be false, may be used as evidence of actual malice. 70 The
Supreme Court, likewise, has indicated that both direct and indi-
rect evidence tend to show the defendant's state of mind regarding
the truth of statements made, including repetitions and later
statements by the defendant. 71
The element of actual malice protects defendants who make
public statements regarding public officials which may place those
public officials in an unflattering light. As Justice Brennan em-
phasized in New York Times v. Sullivan, the standard of actual
malice preserves public discourse and criticism. 72 Consequently,
public figure defamation plaintiffs have a difficult task in estab-
lishing a prima facie case. Recognizing this, courts have admitted
circumstantial as well as direct evidence to prove actual malice. 73
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Weaver v. Lancas-
ter Newspapers further enables public figure defamation plaintiffs
to establish a prima facie case of defamation.
The court's decision in Weaver gives public figure defamation
plaintiffs the benefit of a logical presumption-that republication
of defamatory statements after notification that the statements
are likely to be untrue indicates a general attitude of recklessness
or indifference for the veracity of the statements that likely fac-
tored into the initial publication as well. The holding is limited in
its reach, extending only to those cases where the defendant has
republished the defamatory statements after being notified that
they are not true. This decision enables public figure defamation
cases to overcome the obstacle posed by motions for summary
judgment and will put more plaintiffs before juries who can weigh
the facts and ultimately determine whether actual malice existed
at the time of publication.
The holding in Weaver benefits public figure defamation plain-
tiffs. A significant burden is placed on those plaintiffs through the
requirements of proving a prima facie case. Actual malice, as an
element, is inherently difficult to prove because it pertains to the
state of mind of the defendant regarding the truth of the state-
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 580A cmt. d. (1977).
71. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 164 n.12 (1979). However, in Herbert, the Court
held that editorial processes were relevant to proving actual malice, and thus the extent to
which that holding included republication is unclear. Id. at 176. See also Harte-Hanks
Commc'ns v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668 (1989).
72. N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 272.
73. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 668.
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ment at the time of publication. Direct evidence of the defendant's
state of mind regarding the truth of the statement is likely to be
sparse. Therefore, circumstantial evidence is admissible to prove
actual malice. Due to the evasive nature of actual malice evi-
dence, a motion for summary judgment presents a substantial ob-
stacle to a plaintiffs case. In order to overcome a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff must establish that there is a
genuine issue of material fact. 74 The plaintiff needs to muster evi-
dence of a strength to establish that issue of material fact. Where
there has been republication of defamatory statements after noti-
fication of their falsity, that evidence is strong enough to establish
a genuine issue of material fact-actual malice-if admitted to
show reckless disregard for truth in the initial publication. Ad-
missibility of such evidence helps to bring the case before a jury.
Chief Justice Cappy set forth the proposition that defamation
cases should be heard by a jury, and that it is inappropriate to
dispose of them by way of summary judgment. 75 As the defen-
dant's state of mind is at issue in establishing actual malice, a
jury should hear the evidence presented by both sides and deter-
mine, as a factual matter, whether the defendant acted with reck-
less disregard for the truth.76 The Supreme Court has held that
juries, not judges, should make the ultimate decision whether a
defendant made a publication in bad faith. 77 Because a jury, as a
fact finder, is well suited to make such a determination, and the
court's holding in Weaver serves to supply plaintiffs, in limited
circumstances, additional strength in bringing their cases before a
jury, the decision promotes fairness for plaintiffs.
Though the decision clearly issues a benefit to public figure
defamation plaintiffs, it does not unfairly prejudice defendants.
This decision affects the admissibility, but not the weight, of re-
publication as evidence. The defendant is free to introduce evi-
dence showing that the initial publication was not published with
reckless disregard for the truth of the statements or to minimize
the supposed link between republication and defendant's state of
mind regarding initial publication. For example, a defendant can
74. PA. R. Crv. P §§ 1035.2-.3 (2003).
75. Weaver, 926 A.2d at 907 (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9
(1979)). 'The proof of 'actual malice' calls a defendant's state of mind into question and does
not readily lend itself to summary disposition." Id.
76. Weaver, 926 A.2d at 906-07. Chief Justice Cappy stated that while summary judg-
ment may be an adequate remedy in some defamation cases, it is not suitable in cases
where a material fact is in dispute. Id.
77. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.
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claim that the source of the defamatory statement was a credible
one and that the statement was published in good faith. Should a
jury find that to be the case, the impact of republication on the
finding of actual malice will be diminished.
Indeed, the nature of the standard of actual malice issues a
safeguard for defendants in public figure defamation cases. The
great interest in free speech, public debate, and open criticism of
public officials insulates those who make statements regarding
public figures from liability each time they make statements plac-
ing public figures in a negative light.78 Mere negligence in publi-
cation will not suffice to make a defendant liable. If a plaintiff
cannot show that the defendant published the defamatory state-
ment with something more than negligence, the case will not sur-
vive a motion for summary judgment.
If, however, it can be shown that there is a likelihood that the
defendant published with knowledge of the falsity of the state-
ment or with reckless disregard for its veracity, the defendant
may be subject to liability. Because republication logically indi-
cates indifference for the truth, a defendant who has such evi-
dence presented against him is not being prosecuted unfairly.
Whether that indifference extended back to the time of initial pub-
lication is a question for the jury to decide, given all of the facts.
The decision in Weaver does nothing to lessen the protection that
the standard of actual malice provides defendants. Rather, the
decision makes it easier for a plaintiff to establish a genuine issue
of material fact with regard to actual malice in public figure defa-
mation cases, and it is likely to result in more defamation cases
surviving summary judgment and proceeding to trial.
Diane M. Pisani
78. N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
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